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ABSTRACT 
Substantive bilateral investment treaty (BIT) rules have the 
potential to undermine the rights to health, safety and the 
environment of the citizens of host States if stricter State regulations 
to protect these rights amount to regulatory expropriation or breach 
other investment protection rights. This article argues that the rules 
created by BITs are comparable with and stand parallel to the rules 
created by the domestic laws of host States and BIT arbitral 
tribunals should balance these rights when they conflict with each 
other. BIT arbitral tribunals act as de facto courts since they 
enforce rights that are assertable against the public at large and not 
against the host State alone. Similar to the “rules” created by BITs, 
an analysis of the legal nature of “rights” created by BITs also 
reveals that they are comparable with the rights created by domestic 
laws of host States. The article articulates three legal arguments 
founded on substantive BIT clauses, human rights, and property 
rights on the basis of which, three specific rights, i.e., the rights to 
health, safety and the environment of citizens of host States may 
stand parallel to the rights created by BITs in favour of foreign 
investors. These arguments, both individually and pooled together, 
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call for balancing these citizens’ rights with the rights of foreign 
investors arising from a BIT in the event of conflict. 
KEYWORDS: BITs, right to health, right to safety, right to the environment, 
international law 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current structure of the international investment regime and 
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) based investor-State arbitration (ITA) has 
been widely criticised for being harmful to the public welfare.
1
 The 
criticism is based on the reason that the current regime hampers the ability 
of governments to act for their people in response to the requirements of 
human development and environmental sustainability. This article seeks to 
add another dimension to the literature by analysing BIT arbitration,
2
 and 
the rights created by BITs in light of the distinctions between public and 
private law.
3
 It argues that the rules created by BITs are comparable with 
and stand parallel to the rules created by the domestic laws of host States 
and that arbitral tribunals should balance these respective rights in the event 
of conflict. 
The rights of foreign investors are created by the rules incorporated in 
BITs. The first part of this article seeks to analyse the legal basis by which 
domestic law rules created for citizens of the host State may stand parallel 
to the rules created by BITs for foreign investors. The hypothesis is that as 
a consequence of such parallelism,
4
 BIT arbitrators are required to balance 
BIT rules with any conflicting rules of domestic laws of the host State, 
since the tribunal acts de facto as a court.
5
 For the purposes of its distinct 
approach, the article employs the term ―treaty‖ in its two possible ways, 
                                                          
1  For example, see Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the International Investment 
Regime, Aug. 31, 2010, 
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/documents/Public%20Statemen t.pdf (last visited 
May 21, 2011). 
2 This article primarily deals with BIT arbitration, which it also occasionally refers to as investment 
treaty arbitration or ITA. ITA can, however, be understood in a broader context of investor-State 
arbitration under investment chapter in some free trade agreements, such as NAFTA, or sectoral 
treaties, such as the Energy Charter Treaty. 
3  See generally GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 46 
(2007). 
4 As compared to the norm-theoretic approach in this article, for a somewhat policy oriented 
analysis on the same issue, see Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A 
New Approach for a Different Legal Order, 27 B.C. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 429, 429-31 (2004); 
and see generally Todd Weiler, A First Look at the Interim Merits Award in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. 
Canada: It is Possible to Balance Legitimate Environmental Concerns with Investment Protection, 
24 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 173 (2001). 
5 ―Balancing‖ is a judicial doctrinal process/test that requires courts to assess whether a statute, law 
or other law making or administrative State action ought to be upheld (in light of the governmental 
interest that it serves) despite its impact on a constitutional right. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 83-84 (2001). In domestic law, balancing commonly refers to 
the entire process of judicial determination of whether or not a constitutional right exist and has 
been justifiably limited by any State action. I am using the term for varying aspects of State action, 
including the conclusion of BITs creating rights and making laws for foreign investors potentially 
conflicting with constitutional rights of their citizens, which require balancing by BIT arbitral 
tribunals. On balancing, see generally Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality 
Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 73 (2008). 
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namely, as act of consent or an agreement (ad negotium) and as a document 
or an instrument of proof (ad instrumentum).
6
 
In this context, the article addresses the question: what is the exact 
nature of legal rules created by BITs both in domestic and international 
law? In addition to BIT rules, due to their physical presence within the host 
State‘s sovereign limits, foreign investors are also subject, with respect to 
their property and other rights, to the domestic laws made for citizens of the 
host State.
7
 Special features of the substantive rules created by BITs for 
investors, however, complicate the relationship between domestic and 
international law. In domestic law, BIT rules should be viewed as either 
private (commercial) or public (sovereign) law rules in order to assess their 
standing as compared to domestic public law rules.
8
 
On the international level, the presence of a treaty, such as a BIT, calls 
for the application of public international law to determine the rights of 
foreign investors under that treaty. Foreign investors, though they are not 
party to the underlying treaty, acquire procedural rights to investor-State 
arbitration from these BITs in addition to other substantive rights.
9
 Since 
the locus standi of foreign investors for arbitration is conferred by a treaty 
which is an international law instrument, and arbitral tribunals are supra-
national forums,
10
 the distinction whether investor-State arbitration in 
international law should be categorised as public international law or 
private international law also becomes important for the determination of 
the exact nature of law created by BITs on a supra-national level.
11
 Where 
all these indicators reveal the hybrid nature of rules created by BITs, this 
article advocates that these rules are not only comparable with domestic 
                                                          
6 Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary 
International Law, 14 NW. J. INT‘L L. & BUS. 327, 333 (1994). 
7 See OPPENHEIM‘S INTERNATIONAL LAW: VOLUME 1 PEACE 5 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts 
eds., 9th ed. 2008) (―[A]lthough all States are under certain obligations as regards the treatment of 
aliens, those obligations (generally speaking) can only be invoked by the State whose nationality 
the alien possesses . . . .‖) See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
526 (5th ed. 2002) (―It is also said that the status of the alien is not the subject of a privilege as 
‗alien,‘ but is simply that of an ‗individual‘ within the territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction of the 
host State.‖) 
8 Cf. HARTEN, supra note 3. 
9 The difference between substantive and procedural rights is maintained in this article where 
substantive rights provide ―substance‖ and define the ―real‖ rights of disputing parties that give rise 
to their legal relationship determined in the light of facts and norms. Whereas procedural rights 
provide the ―process,‖ whether it be domestic courts or supra-national arbitration, determining how 
a dispute concerning substantive rights will occur. Cf. id. 
10 See Richard W. Nelson, Avoidance and Settlement of International Investment Disputes, 78 
AMER. SOC. INT‘L L. PROC. 38, 49 (1984). (Remarks by Gerhard Wegen) 
11 For distinction between international law/municipal law and public international law/private 
international law, see MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (5th ed. 2003); For more 
details on the hybrid nature of international investment law, see Weiler, supra note 4, at 429-31; 
See Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, in 74(1) BRITISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (2004). 
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law rules but also stand parallel to them and require balancing in the event 
of conflict. In other words, the hybrid having abundant characteristics of 
domestic law is closer to domestic rules rather than the dominating rules of 
international law. 
Further to the determination of two kinds of domestic and international 
public or private law analysis of BITs, the doctrinal analysis of BITs may 
also be based on the nature of rights created by BITs, i.e., whether the right 
of arbitration created by a BIT is a private (contractual) right or public 
(legislated or constitutional) right.
12
 In addition to the right to arbitrate, 
BITs provide other significant substantive rights to investors, e.g., the right 
to different standards of treatment and compensation for expropriation. 
These substantive rights, when they are enforced by foreign investors, have 
the potential to impede the application of rights belonging to the citizens of 
the host State, e.g., the right to health, safety and the environment 
guaranteed by domestic constitutions and other laws, and international 
conventions and treaties. 
As currently conceived in mainstream commentary, however, both 
investors‘ rights and the citizens‘ rights call for mutually exclusive 
conceptualizations. Nonetheless, both these rights tend to negate each other 
in case of conflict when stricter State regulation to protect citizens‘ rights 
may amount to conflicts with investment protection standards. The 
common element in both categories of rights is that the host State stands 
between the foreign investors and its own citizens. In the second part, the 
article exploits three legal bases, viz. (1) BITs provisions, (2) human rights 
and (3) property rights, by which the rights of the citizens of the host State 
can be viewed as standing on an equal or even superior standing as 
compared to foreign investors‘ rights. This equality, it is argued, not only 
dictates but also eases the balancing of competing rights of foreign 
investors and citizens of the host State in BIT arbitrations. The forgoing 
discussion can be figuratively explained as follows: 
                                                          
12 Here the concept of right is used to cover both the legal right and the right of action. See ROSCOE 
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 84-87 (1959). See also infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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The figure can be understood with the help of horizontal and vertical 
values. The State-State BIT relationship stands in the middle where the 
upper half of the figure shows the international law domain and the lower 
half the domestic law domain. The right half of the picture is the foreign 
investors‘ column and the left half the citizens‘ column. The two hexagons 
are, both located in the investors‘ column, where one is in the international 
law domain and the other in the domestic law domain, revealing the 
potential applicability of both domestic and international laws. 
Two separate analysis are, therefore, required for both entwined but 
distinct questions arising out of the legal relations created by a State by 
concluding a BIT. First, what type of law has been created by a State in 
concluding a BIT? Second, what types of rights have been granted by such 
law? The approach in this article is both assertive and norm-theoretic and 
reveals the need for balancing between investors‘ and citizens‘ rights. The 
modest effort may, therefore, be viewed as futuristic theorising putting 
questions in different legal contexts. The arguments put forward here do 
not depict how most commentators view the present investment treaty 
arbitration system or the relationship between the rights of foreign 
investors and the rights of citizens of host States. Rather, the arguments are 
a descriptive and normative claim suggesting the way it would or should be 
viewed in the future. 
II. TYPE OF LAW CREATED BY BITS 
For the purposes of determining the type of law created by BITs, we 
need to investigate in what capacity a State was acting while concluding a 
BIT with respect to all possible addressees of the act in both domestic and 
international spheres of the State power. The addressees include all States 
and all persons (foreign investors as well as citizens of the host State) that 
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are benefited or affected by the act. Such State capacity can be determined 
by examining the nature of act performed by a State while concluding a 
BIT. In this respect BITs may be treated as sovereign acts, contracts, 
decrees or special laws. 
A. BITs as Sovereign Acts of States 
BITs are sovereign acts of States.
13
 These acts are subject to public 
international law as they are concluded between States.
14
 Individual BITs, 
however, are not ―treaties of public law character‖
15
 and do not create 
customary international law.
16
 In the public international law domain, 
individuals cannot bring claims against States by availing the jurisdiction 
of international dispute settlement forums like the International Court of 
Justice,
17
 or the dispute settlement body of the World Trade Organisation.
18
 
                                                          
13 See LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 35 (1986); SHAW, supra note 11, at 88. 
14 See GEORGE SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (3d ed. 1957). 
15 Treaties of a public law character are of constitutive character and may represent the view of 
powerful States assuming the role of acting in public interest. For detailed analysis of public law 
character treaties, see Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Third Parties and the Law of Treaties, in 6 MAX 
PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW. 37, 70-72 (2002). Though the theory of public law 
treaties has not gained universal acceptance with respect to their being binding on non-party States, 
the public law character of a treaty should logically play a decisive role to determine priority 
between such a treaty and a BIT in case of their mutual conflict where BIT party States are also 
party to such other treaty. This suggests that if a BIT provision is inconsistent with a treaty of a 
public law character to which both BIT Party States are parties, the provisions of the public law 
character treaty should override the BIT provisions. In this context, however, human rights treaties 
and treaties for the preservation and protection of environment (if they are treated as treaties of 
public law character), should have precedence over BIT provisions in case of any mutual conflicts. 
Some human rights incorporated in international conventions have attained the status of jus cogens 
(peremptory norms) and the preamble of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (see infra note 
23 and accompanying text) also provides that the Party States have in mind the universal respect 
for human rights in general. A list of treaties on environmental protection is available at United 
Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP Programmes and Secretariats in Geneva, 
http://www.unep.ch/ (last visited May 21, 2011); Chan Robles Virtual Law Library, 
http://www.chanrobles.com/environmentreaties.htm (last visited May 21, 2011), and see also infra 
note 58 and accompanying text. The discussion on resolution of conflicts between treaties is, 
however, a completely different subject and thus beyond the scope of this article. 
16 Cf. MCNAIR, supra note 13, at 259. It has been, however, recently argued by some scholars that 
the abundance of BITs reiterating similar provisions has translated BIT provisions into a de facto 
universal agreement making rules of public international law. See, e.g., Efraim Chalamish, The 
Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT‘L 
L. 303 (2009). Others have argued that the abundance of BITs does not create customary 
international law and that each BIT is nothing but a lex specialis between parties designed to create 
a mutual regime of investment protection. See Kishoiyian, supra note 6, at 329. 
17 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), arts. 34.1 & 65, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945); For 
individual‘s rights before ICJ, see generally Martin Scheinin, The ICJ and the Individual, 9 INT‘L 
COMMUNITY L. REV. 123 (2007). 
18 See Panel Report, United States － Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R ¶¶ 
7.96, 7.109, 7.125 & 7.136 (Dec. 22, 1999). For comments, see generally Steve Charnovitz, The 
WTO and the Rights of the Individual, INTERECONOMICS 98 (Mar./Apr. 2001), available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/charnovitzindividual.pdf (last visited May 21, 2011). 
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The only exceptions are human right treaties, but they incorporate the 
customary exhaustion of local remedies requirement before an individual 
can seek the jurisdiction of a supra-national dispute resolution forum.
19
 
In contrast, BITs provide individual foreign investors the right to seek 
remedies through supra-national arbitration against violations of 
protections provided to them by the host State.
20
 This characteristic 
embraces BITs within the arena of private international law.
21
 BITs 
therefore, though created by public international law, do not purport to 
create rules of public international law for investors coming from BIT party 
States. In other words, although BITs create public international law rules 
for the Party States, the nature of rules created for investors embrace 
characteristics akin to private international law. Such private international 
law characteristics make BITs not only comparable with domestic laws of 
the host State but also call for an inference of domestic laws when 
interpreting BITs and determining investor‘s rights. However, it should not 
be implied that all kinds of treaties that give individuals the right to supra-
national adjudication fall within the arena of private international law. The 
claims by individuals under human rights treaties, for example, would not 
be private international law claims because of the public law character of 
such treaties.
22
 
B. BITs as Sovereign Contracts 
BITs are also sovereign contracts governed by international law.
23
 If 
we analyse BITs as contracts concluded by individuals,
24
 an investor from a 
                                                          
19 See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, CETS No. 005, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/005.htm (last 
visited May 21, 2011). Cf. Won-Mog Choi, The Present and Future of the Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Paradigm, 10 (3) J. INT‘L ECON. L. 725, 730 (2007). 
20 Either expressly or impliedly by way of ―umbrella clauses,‖ see generally Stephan W. Schill, 
Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of Umbrella Clauses in International 
Investment Treaties, 18 MINN. J. INT‘L L. 1 (2009). 
21 The term ―private international law‖ has been used here to denote its general role as dealing with 
the questions of jurisdiction of national courts of host State over the investment treaty disputes, the 
choice of applicable law on a dispute before ITAs and recognition and enforcement of the ITA 
awards by the domestic courts. See P.M. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH‘S 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 & 453 (12th ed. 1992). 
22 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
23 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. It is not unusual to analyse treaties and especially BITs as an ordinary contract in terms of 
domestic law, see, e.g., Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law and Rationalist Contract 
Theory, (Inst. for Int‘l L. & Just., Int‘l Legal Theory Colloquium Spring 2009: Virtues, Vices, 
Human Behavior and Democracy in International Law, Jan. 22, 2009), available at 
http://iilj.org/courses/2009IILJColloquium.asp (last visited May 21, 2011) 
24 MCNAIR, supra note 13, at 324. States are invested with the power to alienate or otherwise 
restrict the rights of its individuals, both personal and proprietary. 
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BIT Party State has no privity in the BIT contract.
25
 In this context, the 
rights available to an investor under a BIT resemble that of a third party 
beneficiary in general contract law terms.
26
 The rights created by a BIT 
vest in a foreign investor as third party beneficiary when the investor brings 
a dispute against the host State in the BIT designated supra-national arbitral 
forum. Nevertheless, the investor had the right to avail the jurisdiction of 
domestic courts of the host State by virtue of physical presence in the host 
State, and the third party rights created by BITs are not being imposed on 
the investor.
27
 Where it remains discretionary for an investor to seek the 
benefit of the BIT designated supra-national arbitral forum or submit to the 
domestic courts of the host State,
28
 the exercise of this discretion amounts 
to the investor‘s consent to the terms of the BIT. 
The third party beneficiary standing on the basis of contract theory 
does not, by its own, put foreign investors on a superior standing in 
international law as compared to the legal standing of the citizens of the 
host State in domestic laws, except the investor‘s procedural right to supra-
national arbitration that is not available to the citizens and may be treated 
as superior. On the other hand, citizens of the host State are not third party 
beneficiaries in domestic laws. They are subjects to whom States owe 
direct responsibility.
29
 States are under a duty to protect their citizens, both 
in their national constitutions and under international law.
30
 When the 
private nature commercial rules of foreign investment created by BITs 
collide with the public nature and internationally valued rules incorporated 
in domestic laws, balancing is required for resolution of the conflict in 
every course of legal determination. 
C. BITs as Sovereign Decrees 
BITs may also be analysed as sovereign decrees creating objective 
domestic law. BIT parties might be assumed to have created direct 
municipal law by way of a treaty.
31
 It might be argued that these sovereign 
                                                          
25 See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 44 (2009). 
26 See M.P. FURMSTON ET AL., CHESHIRE, FIFOOT & FURMSTON‘S, LAW OF CONTRACT 464-74 
(13th ed. 1996). 
27 Cf. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 14, at 461. 
28 The situation is comparable to the minority status given by a treaty to individuals in a foreign 
territory where the individuals concerned (investors in this case) have the right to determine their 
internationally relevant status. For a detailed discussion, see SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 14, at 
143. 
29 See Kojo Yelpaala, Fundamentalism in Public Health and Safety in Bilateral Investment Treaties 
[Part II], 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT‘L HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 465, 465-67 (2008). 
30 Id. 
31 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 14, at 146. There is a degree of disagreement in the practice of 
States regarding the direct application of treaties in their domestic spheres without specific 
domestic legislation to that effect. States following ―monism‖ assume that international law does 
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decrees override national constitutions and other laws because a BIT party 
State cannot succeed in pleading a breach of its domestic constitution or 
other laws as justification to violate its BIT obligations.
32
 Where BITs 
assign foreign investors a procedural right to bring disputes before supra-
national arbitral tribunals,
33
 they also give substantive rights (e.g., 
compensation for expropriation and fair and equitable treatment) to foreign 
investors enforceable against the host States. From this perspective, BITs 
operate as sovereign decrees promulgating public rights for foreign 
investors where BIT party States are under a duty to enforce these rights 
not only against themselves but also erga omnes (against the whole world) 
including public entities, all individuals together with its citizens as well as 
other States.
34
 Creation of these rights for foreign investors amounts to the 
recognition of limited international personality of foreign investors by BIT 
party States.
35
 
Does this actually mean that the constitutional rights of the citizens of 
the host State play no role in the determination of public rights of the 
foreign investors? I doubt that. In case of conflicts between sovereign 
decrees (BIT and domestic public laws), the very existence of conflict 
necessarily dictates balancing. It might be presumed that the BIT tribunals 
are not obliged to strive for such balancing, as compared to national courts 
of the host State. There is, however, no apparent restriction on them not to 
assume this obligation. BITs as sovereign decrees create domestic public 
law, which is comparable with other domestic public laws created by the 
host State. The only difference is that in addition to the jurisdiction of 
domestic courts, the primary subjects/addresses of BITs (foreign investors) 
are also entitled to benefit from supra-national arbitration for settlement of 
their disputes with the host State. 
D. BITs as special laws 
BITs are also comparable to legislative instruments promulgated for a 
particular class of subjects.
36
 In this respect, BITs may be characterised as 
special laws that, as compared to general laws, apply to a particular class of 
people (foreign investors) but not to everyone (citizens of the host State) 
                                                                                                                                
not need to be translated into national law and the act of ratifying a treaty immediately incorporates 
that treaty into national law. On the other hand, some States follow ―dualism‖ that a treaty does not 
automatically become part of domestic law unless explicitly incorporated by domestic legislation. 
See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation 
of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 628-705 (2007). 
32 VCLT, supra note 23, art. 46(1); SHAW, supra note 11, at 846. 
33 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; SHAW, supra note 11, at 1-2. 
34 Cf. MCNAIR, supra note 13, at 256; Cf. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 14, at 458. 
35 Cf. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 14, at 459. 
36 VAN HARTEN, supra note 3, at 45. 
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present in the host State. Under the terms of BITs, access to supra-national 
arbitration is not available to the citizens of BIT party States when they are 
acting within their own States. This analysis raises questions for the 
validity of BITs being arbitrary as against fundamental rights of equality 
before law incorporated in most State constitutions or imported from 
human rights jurisprudence.
37
 Though States might be presumed to have 
been restricted to justify breach of BIT obligations due to their conflict with 
domestic laws, the citizens of the host State are not restricted from claiming 
rights equal to foreign investors. This approach suggests that a citizen of 
the BIT Party State may petition to a competent domestic court for a ruling 
to avail rights equal to foreign investors including the right to initiate 
and/or defend a supra-national arbitration. It might be argued that this 
would not be a decisive move for the citizens of host States where supra-
national arbitral tribunals are not bound by the rulings of domestic courts in 
a BIT dispute. I, however, contend that, although the arbitral tribunals are 
not, States are in effect bound by the rulings of domestic courts and the 
domestic courts can compel States to require tribunals to entertain claims of 
their citizens in cases where they are allowed to devise such procedures in a 
BIT arbitration. 
Substantive BIT provisions construed as special domestic law 
applicable only to foreign investors may also become discriminatory 
against the citizens of host States. The question of discrimination arises 
when the subjects of this special law (foreign investors) become entitled to 
compensation against a State regulation causing loss or damage to their 
investments and the citizen, on the other hand, are not so entitled against 
the same State regulation. In the present system of ITA provided under 
BITs, however, tribunals are not mandated to consider discrimination 
against the citizens of the host State. Any actions to eliminate such 
procedural and substantive discrimination taken by the citizens of host 
States in domestic courts may, nonetheless, be able to influence future 
investment policies and result in a change in the standard provisions of 
BITs negotiated by their State. 
III. TYPES OF RIGHTS CREATED BY A BIT 
There are several distinct dimensions to analysing the rights created by 
BITs.
38
 The question addressed in this article is whether rights created by 
                                                          
37 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 7, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. 
mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 18, 1992). 
38 Rights are diversely construed as legal, social, or moral freedoms or entitlements to act or refrain 
from acting. There is considerable disagreement about what is precisely meant by the term ―rights.‖ 
In domestic legal systems, there are two main constructions of rights i.e. ―rule construction‖ and 
―principle construction.‖ See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 47-49 
(Julian Rivers trans., 2002). For the purposes of this article, we may treat the rights created and 
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BITs are private or public rights. The test for this determination is based on 
the question of against whom these rights can be asserted.
39
 If they are 
assertable only against a specific person (or a State in case of BITs), they 
are private rights and if they are assertable against the whole world and not 
merely against the BIT party States, they are public rights.
40
 The 
significance of this determination is that if the rights created by BITs in 
favour of investors are public rights as compared to private rights, they are 
comparable with the other public rights of the citizens of the host State. 
Furthermore, if the rights of citizens of the host State can be constructed on 
the parallel standing to the investors‘ rights under BITs, both these rights 
need balancing in case of conflict. In other words, the scheme is to 
determine the nature of both investors‘ and citizens‘ rights as public or 
private and then compare them with each other in order to determine 
whether they require balancing. 
In respect of citizens‘ rights, the focus of this article is the rights to 
health, safety and the environment of citizens of States hosting foreign 
investment under BITs. BITs create specific rights in favour of foreign 
investors. BITs also tend to impliedly create rights in favour of citizens of 
the host States.
41
 These rights of citizens of the host State may also be 
construed on the basis of interpretive devices applicable to BIT arbitrations 
in international law. Finally, these rights may also equate to property rights, 
the protection of which is the right of individual citizens as against the 
public at large including foreign investors. Drawing on the wisdom of 
citizenship as ―the right to have rights;‖ the pooling together of different 
legal bases to construct these rights can be conceptualized as both the rights 
as power (recognition or assertion of rights on the basis of interest) and the 
power to exercise rights (enforcement of rights). The effort may, however, 
be viewed as futuristic theorising putting questions in different legal 
contexts. 
                                                                                                                                
legislated by domestic laws (and constitutions) of the host States as ―rule rights‖ or ―de jure 
rights,‖ the rights which exist in theory as ―principle rights‖ or ―de facto rights‖ and the rights of 
the foreign investor created by BITs as ―special treaty rights.‖ The ―special treaty rights‖ may be 
treated as ―hybrid rights‖ because BITs are a hybrid of public and private character on international 
level in respect of supra-national arbitration and also because BITs tend to create a hybrid of public 
and private rules on domestic level by way of substantive provisions. Cf. Douglas, supra note 11. 
Cf. infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
39 For detailed discussion on classification of rights, see, e.g., POUND, supra note 12, at 84-90. 
40 Id. 
41 See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of 
Japan for the Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-Korea, art. 16(1)(c), 
Mar. 22, 2002, available at http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/korea_japan.pdf (last visited May 
21, 2011). It provides that contracting parties may ―take any measure necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health.‖ See also Agreement between Japan and the Government of the 
Republic of Peru for the Promotion, Protection and Liberalisation of Investment, Japan-Peru, arts. 
19 & 26, Nov. 14, 2010. See infra notes 53 & 55 and accompanying text. 
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A. Rights Belonging to Foreign Investors 
I have discussed earlier that by concluding a BIT with a provision for 
investor-State arbitration, party States not only recognize a limited 
international personality of investors,
42
 but also create substantive rights for 
foreign investors.
43
 In this section, I shall endeavour to describe the nature 
of rights created by BITs in favour of foreign investors in respect of those 
against whom they may be asserted.
44
 The question is whether the 
investors‘ rights are assertable against the whole world – the public at large 
including States which are international persons – (in rem rights) or against 
some particular international person alone i.e. BIT party States (in 
personam rights). In rem rights are proprietary in nature,
45
 arising from 
relation to property (res) and not based on a personal relationship 
(agreement) as is the case with in personam rights.
46
 In other words, in 
personam rights are private rights and in rem rights are public rights. 
The plain answer to the question is that BITs create both rights in 
personam and in rem for the investors. First, as BITs are sovereign 
contracts and investors from party States are third party beneficiaries, the 
investors‘ rights are in personam, assertable against the host State and none 
else. The right to international arbitration is the only exact fit in this 
category as compared to other substantive rights granted by BITs because 
they are assertable against the whole world, including States and their 
citizens. Most BITs provide the standards of ―full protection and 
security.‖
47
 The standard requires the host States to protect the foreign 
investors‘ investments from all acts causing loss or damage to investment. 
A host State can be held liable under this standard for acts that have not 
been directed or carried out by the host State itself or its functionaries.
48
 In 
this sense, the foreign investor‘s rights are assertable against the whole 
world even though the liability is only of the host State to make good any 
losses suffered due to its failure to provide full protection and security to 
the foreign investor‘ investments. 
Secondly, BITs as sovereign decrees of States give foreign investors 
rights in rem in relation to property (investments) that are assertable against 
                                                          
42 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
43 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
44 For detailed discussion on classification of rights, see POUND, supra note 12, at 84-90. Cf. supra 
notes 12 & 38 and accompanying text. 
45 The concept of property in international law includes both tangible and intangible property. 
Kishoiyian, supra note 6, at 342-43. 
46 POUND, supra note 12, at 85. 
47 See, e.g., Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Arg.-U.S., art. II(2)(a), Nov. 14, 1991; 
See also France-H.K. BIT, art. 2(2). 
48See, e.g., Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award, ¶ 67, 
(June 27, 1990). 
108 4(1) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 95 [2011 
 
the whole world. In other words, BITs create both public and private rights 
in favour of foreign investors. The public rights of foreign investors in 
respect of property are comparable with rights of citizens of host State 
arising from domestic public laws. The only private right of investors is the 
right to supra-national arbitration, which is merely a procedural right as 
compared to substantive property rights created by BITs. ITA awards are 
therefore judgments that determine the rights in respect to the foreign 
investors‘ property against the entire world (including the citizens of host 
State and State owned entities and administrative bodies), and not just 
against the parties to the dispute, although only host States can be held 
liable for violation of these rights.
49
 In other words, the ITA tribunals 
indeed act as de facto courts. 
B. Rights Belonging to Citizens of Host State 
A host State‘s regulation to protect public interest causing harm to 
foreign investors‘ property raises important public policy issues. This 
concern compelled some authors to argue that ITA tribunal are 
―businessman‘s courts.‖
50
 A crucial role for ITA tribunals, while dealing 
with the host States‘ sovereign powers to regulate resulting in loss or 
damage to the investments of foreign investors, is to balance between the 
rights of foreign investors and the rights of citizens of the host State. Host 
States are bound by the so-called ―chilling effect‖ of BITs not to implement 
any regulations harmful for the investments of the foreign investors.
51
 In 
the sense of BITs as sovereign decrees, host States might also be deemed to 
have legislated foreign investors‘ rights in their domestic laws where they 
may conflict with the laws created to protect public rights (interests) of 
their citizens.
52
 Balancing is required between two public rights, i.e., rights 
of foreign investors and those of the citizens of host States. 
By concluding a BIT, the host State binds both itself and its citizens to 
the terms of that BIT.
53
 In any case, the host States‘ liabilities against 
foreign investors do not impede the rights of the citizens of the host State 
when their rights have either equal (in domestic laws) or superior (in 
international law or multilateral treaties) standing or binding force as 
compared to the investors‘ rights. In the following section, I shall 
                                                          
49 As if they are pronounced by courts and not mere awards rendered by arbitral tribunals in literal 
sense in which they are understood in commercial arbitration. 
50 VAN HARTEN, supra note 3, at 152-84. 
51 See generally SURYA SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND 
PRINCIPLES 161-71 (2008). 
52 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 14, at 146. 
53 MCNAIR, supra note 13. Although BITs do not create direct obligations for citizens of a host 
state, the citizens would be indirectly affected (as tax payers) if a host State has to pay 
compensation to an investor for violation of a BIT. 
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endeavour to locate and outline the rights of the citizens to health, safety 
and the environment in the context of BITs and ITAs. The effort, as I said 
earlier, may be viewed as futuristic theorising putting questions in different 
legal contexts. This theorising for the assertion of rights belonging to 
citizens of host States has three possible rationales: 
1. Rights granted to citizens by specific BIT provisions (BIT provisions 
rationale) 
2. Citizens‘ rights as human rights (Human rights rationale) 
3. Citizens‘ rights as property rights (Property rights rationale) 
1. BIT Provisions Rationale. — The latest generation of BITs include 
clauses to safeguard certain standards of protection of health, safety and the 
environment by the host States.
54
 Though the strength of these BIT clauses 
is debatable and appears to only be sunject to the regulatory regime in these 
areas prevalent at the time of entry of foreign investment,
55
 they give an 
impression of recognition of rights to health, safety and the environment of 
the people of host State in contrast to the foreign investors‘ rights under 
that BIT.
56
 The extent of protection of these rights is, however, limited to 
the position where they stood at the time of entry of the foreign investment. 
It means that when at the time of entry of the foreign investment, the host 
State had enacted domestic legislation for protection of health, safety and 
the environment, the foreign investors are bound to the extent of that 
legislation. 
It can be concluded that the host State has impliedly restricted itself to 
implement any higher standards to protect the right to health, safety and the 
environment than the one existing at the time of entry of the foreign 
investment. If the host State would implement higher standards than the 
one existing at the time of entry of investment, it may amount to regulatory 
expropriation or breach of BIT standards of treatment for foreign 
investment. This brings competition between the rights of citizens in 
existing laws of the host State and the rights of the individuals in the field 
of health, safety and the environment recognised by international standards 
or laws of the civilised countries. In other words, the relevant BIT clauses 
                                                          
54 See, e.g., Article 11 of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT; Article 12 of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT; 
Article 11 of the 2007 Norwegian Model BIT and Article 20 and 21 of the 2005 IISD Model 
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development. 
55 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Some latest BIT proposals (e.g. Article 10 Canadian 
Model BIT (2004) and Article 24 Norwegian Model BIT (2007)) and the latest BITs concluded by 
Japan (see, e.g., Article 15(1)(c) Japan-Vietnam BIT and reservations of Japan to the Japan-Peru 
BIT) contain provisions designed to safeguard a State‘s right to regulate even after the investment 
is made. 
56 2007 Norwegian Model BIT, art. 11 reads ―The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to 
encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures or core 
labour standards. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to 
waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion or retention of an investment of an investor.‖ 
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tend to recognise only legislated or de jure and not any unlegislated or de 
facto rights of the individuals for health, safety and the environment.
57
 
What would be the position of these unlegislated de facto rights when they 
find legitimacy from the fundamental rights guaranteed by the national 
constitution of the host State pre-existing the time of entry of foreign 
investment? The question becomes more interesting when these de facto 
rights have legitimate standing in general international law in the shape of 
international conventions and treaties.
58
 
As a matter of domestic law, the de facto rights are more often than not 
transformed into de jure rights by the domestic courts on the basis of 
constitutional theories of fundamental and human rights.
59
 However, at 
least to the extent of de jure rights of the citizens expressly available in 
domestic laws and constitutions of the host State at the time of entry of 
foreign investment, BIT tribunals cannot escape balancing them with the 
rights of foreign investors under BITs. 
2. Human Rights Rationale. — The primary responsibility of an ITA 
tribunal is the interpretation of the treaty (e.g., BIT) that provides both the 
procedural and substantive basis for the dispute.
60
 Under the rules of treaty 
interpretation as provided by Article 31.3 (c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties,
61
 arbitrators may interpret treaty obligations in the 
light of ―relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties.‖ Questions, however, arise as to what rules of 
international law are relevant in a given context of BIT arbitration at ITA. 
From a human rights perspective, which human rights are relevant or 
perhaps even overriding in the process of treaty interpretation, i.e., human 
rights that are based on public moral imperative and shared norms of actual 
human moralities, as justified moral norms supported by strong reasons, as 
legal right at a national level or as legal rights within international law?
62
 
Some human rights have become legal rights in international law with the 
                                                          
57 For some reflections on rights, see supra notes 38 & 39 and accompanying text. 
58 Cf. Fitzmaurice, supra note 15. A number of international treaties and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights recognise inter alia rights of individuals to health, safety and the environment. 
For text and commentary of the eight major human rights treaties and conventions, see Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Human Rights Law, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (last visited May 21, 
2011). 
59  See, e.g., Robert Alexy, The Construction of Constitutional Rights 
http://www.clb.ac.il/workshops/2009/articles/alexy.pdf (last visited May 21, 2011). 
60 See generally Campbell McLachlan, Investment Treaties and General International Law, 57(2) 
INT‘L & COMP. L.Q. 361 (2008). 
61 VCLT, supra note 23. To date the Vienna Convention has 45 signatories and 108 parties. 
62 Human rights can be considered to be independent in their existence and justification as moral 
standards whether or not they are recognized by a particular national or international legal system 
or government. See JAMES NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 251 (1987). Cf. supra note 38 
and accompanying text. 
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status of jus cogens (norms against slavery or racial discrimination); others 
are contained in the U.N. Charter,
63
 and the universal human rights treaties 
and conventions.
64
 
In any case, a wide horizon is open for ITA tribunals to consider 
human rights in the course of interpreting the obligations contained in 
investment treaties to justify State regulations for public interest and 
sustainability objectives and to impede violations of public rights to health, 
safety and the environment by a foreign investor. A glance at the body of 
disputes that have been submitted to ITA reveals that human rights law has 
in effect already been raised in a number of instances.
65
 There is an 
emerging trend whereby human rights obligations owed by the host State to 
non-parties to the ITA proceedings (individual citizens or groups within the 
States‘ jurisdiction) are coming into the picture.
66
 Recently, governments, 
and sometimes non-governmental organizations joining ITA as amicus 
curiae, have referred to these human rights obligations in an effort to 
justify or defend certain government actions or measures that may have had 
breached the investment treaty obligations. Nonetheless, the interaction 
between human rights and investors‘ rights in ITA is highly fertile, 
although complex, and requires balancing. 
3. Property Rights Rationale. — James Madison contended in his 
essay on property, ―as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may 
be equally said to have a property in his rights.‖
67
 The actual and true 
determinant of property should, therefore, be the rights of an individual 
with regard to any property (tangible or intangible) and not the relationship 
between individual and property (defined in classical terms of possession 
and ownership).
68
 Historically, property rights belonged to property in 
shape of things from which possessors (owners) could choose to exclude 
others with the expectation that those others would respect that choice.
69
 In 
case of several co-owners, any co-owner could exclude any non-owner, but 
                                                          
63 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 37. 
64 Cf. supra notes 15 & 58 and accompanying text. 
65 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION (Pierre-
Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009); See also James D. Fry, International Human Rights Law in 
Investment Arbitration: Evidence of International Law’s Unity, 18 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT‘L L. 77 
(2007); see generally LUKE ERIC PETERSON, HUMAN RIGHT AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: MAPPING THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WITHIN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 
(2009), available at http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/globalization/HIRA-volume3-
ENG.pdf (last visited May 21, 2011). 
66  See generally INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REPORTER, VOL. 2(8), May 11, 2009, 
http://www.iareporter.com/downloads/20100107 (last visited May 21, 2011). 
67 James Madison, Property, NAT‘L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 480 (1865). 
68 For detailed analysis of ownership and possession in respect of property rights, see ROSCOE 
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 79-117 (1959). 
69 Id. 
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not other co-owners. Still, a co-owned property would be private property 
because of the right of the co-owners to exclude non-owners.
70
 
From this perspective, the right to the environment may also be treated 
as a property right. The hypothesis that the right to environment is a 
property right brings the historical notion of property with a right to 
exclude others in contrast with an open-access commons, where all may 
use the resource (property) and none may exclude others.
71
 Though nobody 
has a right to exclude, everybody has a right to use and protect the 
environment.
72
 The contemporary legal and social significance of 
―environment property‖ is, therefore, not property in shape of things 
capable of being possessed with exclusion of others rather the rights owned 
by individuals to use and protect from damage. An important distinction 
therefore exists between property ownership and property rights. On the 
same footing, rights to good health and safety can also be rendered as 
property rights. The simple reason is that they are rights, and every right 
represents a property in its subject matter. 
The question, however, is whether these property rights (health, safety 
and the environment) are public or private property rights.
73
 In case of 
these being public property rights with unlimited access, the State is 
responsible to protect these rights by public (constitutional or 
administrative) law. States can, therefore, be considered constitutional 
custodians of these rights and under a liability to protect them in the event 
of any harm or damage. The same responsibility is owed to States even if 
these rights are considered as private property rights. The interesting 
element in these rights with respect to foreign investors is that these are not 
limited to a particular individual, class of individuals, society or even one 
territory (especially in case of the environment) and belong to every 
individual irrespective of nationality or status. The question follows, 
whether the foreign investors co-own these rights with the citizens of host 
State. If yes, they would still be liable if they damage the co-owned 
property. 
The rights to health and safety may not be treated as tradable rights (as 
a right to a commercial property that can be sold or purchased) as 
compared to the right to a clean environment that can be considered as a 
                                                          
70 Id. 
71  For some comparisons and distinction between limited access and open access community 
properties, see James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95(1) 
CORNELL L. REV. 139, 144 (2009). 
72  Principle 1, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
[hereinafter Stockholm Declaration], U.N. Doc. 11 I.L.M. 1416 (June 16, 1972). 
73 The distinction between private and public rights is again on the basis of the test as to against 
whom these are assertable. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A. 
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tradable right.
74
 If the environment is treated as a tradable right, it might be 
argued that the host State has traded-off the right to environment of its 
citizens when it concluded a BIT allowing foreign investment in its 
territory on terms that it will not impose stricter regulations to protect the 
environment than those existing at the time of entry of the foreign 
investment. This brings us again to the question whether States have the 
capacity to conclude treaties that negate their obligations arising from 
domestic laws or other international treaties.
75
 Considering environment as 
a tradable right, however, the foreign investors would either be treated as 
co-owners of environment property with citizens or implied licensees of the 
host State to use the environment property. As stated earlier, foreign 
investors cannot escape liability if they damage a co-owned property. 
However, if the foreign investors are licensees, the terms of implied license 
may be deemed to include implicit acceptance of associated environmental 
damage. In this case, the question is whether or not the terms of this license 
are unilaterally alterable by the host State in varying circumstances? 
In any case, the right to environment property can be construed as a 
public right which is not only shared by both citizens of the host States and 
the foreign investors but also protected by domestic laws and universally 
acceptable international norms.
76
 When the right to environment clashes 
with the other rights granted by BITs to foreign investors, balancing is 
inevitable. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Although created and governed by the rules of public international law, 
BITs are not treaties of public law character and create rules of private 
international law. The exceptional right of foreign investors to supra-
national arbitration bypassing domestic laws brings BITs even closer to the 
notion of private international law. Such private international law 
characteristics make BITs not only comparable with domestic laws of the 
host State but also call for an application of domestic laws when 
interpreting BITs. Where foreign investors naturally prefer investor 
friendly supra-national arbitration over the domestic courts of the host State 
to resolve their disputes with the host States, these supra-national tribunals 
can, however, view themselves as an extension of the domestic courts 
                                                          
74 See generally COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA, ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: A COMMONWEALTH DISCUSSION PAPER (1990). 
75 Yelpaala, supra note 29, at 465-67. 
76  A list of international agreements for the protection of the environment is available at 
Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators, http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/ (last visited May 21, 
2011). See also supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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created by BITs, which are indeed sovereign decrees promulgating 
domestic law. 
Foreign investors do not have privity of contract in BITs, and the third 
party beneficiary standing on the basis of contract theory does not put 
foreign investors on a superior standing as compared to the citizens of the 
host States. When the private nature of commercial rules of foreign 
investment created by BITs collide with the public nature and 
internationally valued rules incorporated in domestic laws, balancing is 
required in the every course of legal determination. Furthermore, the 
decisions of ITA tribunals determine rights that are assertable against the 
whole world and not merely against the defending States. Tribunals are 
therefore required to balance BIT rules when they conflict with the public 
law rules created by domestic laws. A further analysis of BIT rules as 
special laws reveals that these rules are potentially discriminatory against 
the citizens of host States since they create more favourable procedural and 
substantive rights for foreign investors. Any domestic court‘s ruling 
declaring BITs discriminatory against the State citizen might alter the 
future as well as existing BIT practices in a way that brings the application 
of domestic laws before ITA tribunals. 
The rights based analysis of BITs highlighted that the rights of foreign 
investors under BITs can be divided into private and public rights. They are 
private to the extent of the right to supra-national arbitration which is 
assertable against the host State alone acting as an international person. The 
other substantive rights given by BITs to foreign investors are public in 
nature since they are assertable against the public at large including the 
citizens of the host State. This factor makes these rights comparable with 
the rights of the citizens stemming from the specific BIT provisions, 
domestic laws and constitutions of the host States, international law, or 
from other international treaties concluded by the host State, and call for 
balancing. 
In contrast to the foreign investors‘ rights, the rights to health, safety 
and the environment of the citizens of host States have been gradually 
strengthened in the latest generation of concluded and proposed BITs. By 
requiring a stand-still of the regulatory regime prevalent at the time of entry 
of foreign investment, these BITs have at least the effect of maintaining the 
status quo for the minimum level of protections provided by the domestic 
laws of the host States of citizen‘s rights to health, safety and the 
environment. A gradual transition from the modest recognition and 
conservation of these rights to a general authorization of more abstract 
standards of human rights is expected in light of the increasing pressure on 
States to curtail the privileges granted to foreign investors that hurt public 
interests. The increasing trend of amicus curie briefs raising human rights 
concerns in ITAs is evidence of such a development. 
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Although it may appear to be over ambitious at present, the right to the 
environment may also be treated as a shared property right between citizens 
of host State and foreign investors. In this regard, foreign investors may 
also be treated as licensees to use environment property. None of these 
assertions give the foreign investor a right to damage the environment 
property. The argument of trading-off the environment property with 
foreign investment is flawed since the foreign investors also share the right 
to use the environment property with the citizens of the host State. The 
arbitrators may, therefore, be required to protect the environment property 
by balancing the damage caused to it by foreign investors and the efforts 
made by the host State for its protection. 
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